Washington Law Review
Volume 91

Number 3

10-1-2016

Not Too Separate or Unequal: Marriage Penalty Relief after
Obergefell
Mitchell L. Engler
Edward D. Stein

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mitchell L. Engler & Edward D. Stein, Not Too Separate or Unequal: Marriage Penalty Relief after
Obergefell, 91 Wash. L. Rev. 1073 (2016).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol91/iss3/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

07 - Engler & Stein.docx (Do Not Delete)

10/4/2016 5:10 PM

NOT TOO SEPARATE OR UNEQUAL:
MARRIAGE PENALTY RELIEF AFTER OBERGEFELL
Mitchell L. Engler & Edward D. Stein
Abstract: Joint tax returns have generated controversy for many years. Married couples
with the same joint income pay the same tax under our current system regardless of the
earnings distribution between the spouses. This approach primarily rests on the idea that
married couples share resources and operate as a single economic unit. Critics typically
challenge this assumption and lament how marriage might significantly change a couple’s
taxes. Depending on their earnings breakdown, a couple’s taxes could be reduced (a marital
bonus for uneven-earners) or increased (a marital penalty for even-earners). These
possibilities exist because the joint brackets are typically larger–but not twice as large–as the
unmarried brackets.
Recent Supreme Court decisions about same-sex marriage revitalize this debate since
many same-sex couples face the marriage penalty. In response, some recent commentators
propose the elimination of joint returns. However, such elimination faces serious roadblocks,
including political concerns and tension with marriage’s collaborative character. While
higher joint bracket allowances likewise would provide penalty relief, this would increase
both marital bonuses and the associated revenue loss.
We propose instead a unique solution to the current standstill: an option for married
couples to calculate their tax on their separate earnings. These separate amounts would be
combined on a joint return. The new separate brackets would be more than half the joint
allowance but less than the singles cap. This range permits maximum flexibility to balance
revenue concerns with other important values. Further, our approach would provide
significant penalty relief without any undesired impact on bonuses. It also would maintain
our deeply ingrained joint return system. Finally, we demonstrate the superiority of our
proposal over other suggested compromises.
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INTRODUCTION
Though happily married, Angela and David Boyter would divorce at
year end only to remarry early the next year.1 What explains such
strange behavior? Interestingly, the U.S. imperfect tax code motivated
the Boyters’ legal antics. Under the joint return system, certain couples
pay higher taxes if married (as of December 31) than if unmarried. This
results from the way the joint return system aggregates each spouse’s
earnings and then calculates the couple’s tax based on joint marital
brackets. Importantly, these joint brackets typically are larger than—but
not twice as large as—the unmarried brackets.2 Thus, a married couple’s
taxes generally increase upon marriage (a marital penalty) when the
spouses earn roughly the same amount as each other. In the other
direction, marriage can reduce a couple’s taxes (a marital bonus) when
one spouse earns a great deal more than the other. The Boyters hoped to
obtain the non-tax benefits of marriage for most of the year while
avoiding the substantial tax hit associated with the marriage penalty.3

1. Boyter v. Comm’r, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981).
2. As discussed in greater detail in section I.B.1, the penalty also stems from our use of
progressive rates. Our progressive rate system applies higher rates as income crosses over certain
thresholds. The marriage penalty aspect arises where the joint thresholds are not twice as large as
the single thresholds. We provide an illustrative example below in this Introduction. See infra notes
10–17 and accompanying text.
3. The Boyters’ attempt to avoid the marriage penalty failed. The appellate court held that the two
divorces followed by the two subsequent remarriages were “sham transaction[s]” since the
“underlying purpose” was “for the taxpayers to remain effectively married while avoiding the
marriage penalty.” Boyter, 668 F.2d at 1387.
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While the marital penalty has existed for many years, recent family
law developments place it back in the spotlight. In Obergefell v.
Hodges,4 the United States Supreme Court held that states must allow
same-sex couples to marry and give full recognition to such marriages.5
While same-sex couples may now marry throughout the United States,
the joint return system imposes a significant cost on many of them. As a
result, some such couples may decide to cohabitate in lieu of marriage or
to opt for a civil union, domestic partnership, or other marriage-like
relationship.6 This is because many same-sex couples are relatively even
earners.7 Partly in light of this, some commentators have renewed calls
to excise joint returns.8 Such elimination faces serious practical
4. __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
5. Id.
6. The federal government does not treat civil unions or domestic partnerships as marriages, in
general, and the Internal Revenue Service does not recognize such relationships as marriages for
purposes of filing status. See Answers to Frequently Asked Questions for Registered Domestic
Partners and Individuals in Civil Unions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/
uac/answers-to-frequently-asked-questions-for-registered-domestic-partners-and-individuals-incivil-unions [https://perma.cc/2B8R-T5TH] (question 1). However, couples in domestic
partnerships or civil unions in community property states that treat such relationships as the legal
equivalent to marriage must split their community income on their federal returns. See I.R.S. Chief
Couns. Mem. 201021050 (May 5, 2010), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/1021050.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E4DA-LGHU]. See also Answers to Frequently Asked Questions for Registered
Domestic Partners and Individuals in Civil Unions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/uac/answers-to-frequently-asked-questions-for-registered-domestic-partnersand-individuals-in-civil-unions [https://perma.cc/2B8R-T5TH] (question 9). As this article was
going to press, the IRS issued regulations that clarified certain aspects of the Internal Revenue Code
(IRS) as it relates to marriage. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-18(a) (2016). Specifically, these regulations
require the terms “husband” and “wife” to be interpreted in a gender-neutral way in the IRC. They
also reaffirm that individuals who are parties to a civil union, a registered domestic partnership, or
the like, are not married for purposes of the IRC. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-18(c).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 85–88.
8. See, e.g., Lily Kahng, The Not-So-Merry Wives of Windsor: The Taxation of Women in SameSex Marriages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 337–43 (2015) [hereinafter Kahng, Not-So-Merry
Wives]; Lily Kahng, Marriage Tax Hurts Lesbian Couples, USA TODAY, April 12, 2015,
at
7A,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/04/12/same-sex-marriage-dual-earningcouples-marriage-penalties-joint-filing-taxes-column/25474745
[https://perma.cc/NFA3-UAXB]
[hereinafter Kahng, Marriage Tax Hurts]; Melissa Murray & Dennis Ventry, Eliminate the
Marriage Penalty, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (Jan. 23, 2015, 2:43 PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/04/14/improving-on-the-tax-codes-marriagepenalty/eliminate-the-marriage-penalty [https://perma.cc/R2QS-QLP5]. Others have argued for the
elimination of joint return long before Obergefell. See, e.g., Anne Alstott, Updating the Welfare
State: Marriage, the Income Tax, and Social Security in the Age of Individualism, 66 TAX L. REV.
695 (2013); Shari Motro, The New “I Do”: Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 1509 (2006); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339
(1994); Marjorie Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint
Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63 (1993); Pamela Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a
Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1980).
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problems, including political and transitional concerns.9 Others have
suggested higher joint brackets as a way to provide penalty relief. As
illustrated below, however, this would cause an unjustified increase in
marital bonuses with significant additional tax revenue loss.
This leaves a problematic status quo: significant marital penalties
without an obvious fix. We propose a unique and viable solution to this
current quandary: provide married couples the option to calculate their
income tax based on their separate earnings. The individual tax amounts
would then be aggregated on a jointly filed marital return. By
maintaining our deeply ingrained joint-return system, our proposal
enhances political feasibility and minimizes transitional concerns. And
unlike higher joint bracket allowances, our proposal allows marriage
penalty relief without a corollary increase to marital bonuses. This limits
revenue loss while preserving marital bonuses at an appropriate level.
As noted above, our proposal would allow married couples the option
to calculate taxes based on each spouse’s separate earnings. Full penalty
relief would require separate brackets equal to the single unmarried
brackets. Given revenue concerns, the separate brackets need not rise to
that amount, as any amount above half the joint level would provide
some penalty relief. Thus, our approach provides attractive flexibility to
balance penalty relief with revenue concerns.
In this regard, our proposal differs from the existing, but rarely used,
married filing separate status. Married people currently have an option
to file separate returns. This is rarely advantageous since the brackets are
just half the joint return amount. Our proposal differs from the current
married filing separate option in two main ways. First, our “married
calculated separate” approach provides penalty relief by providing
bracket allowances above half the joint return amount. Second, under
our approach, married couples would still file a joint return given the
collaborative value of such joint action.
The following example illustrates the above points. Assume a
progressive rate structure for single taxpayers with a 20% rate on the
first $150,000 of income and 30% thereafter. Further assume a joint
married allowance of $200,000 for the lower 20% rate. If Tim and Dan
each earn $150,000, they would face a $10,000 marital penalty. If they
cohabitate without marriage, each would pay tax at the lower 20% rate
on all his income: $30,000 tax each for a $60,000 total. Marriage would
9. As discussed in section II.C.1, it also raises some theoretic issues. Joint return elimination
triggers transitional concerns because it gets rid of the current marital bonuses that certain couples
receive. Consider, for instance, taxpayers who may have taken such bonuses into account in
reaching the marital decision. See infra text accompanying note 92.
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increase their tax to $70,000 since they would pay tax at the higher 30%
rate on $100,000 of their combined income.10 They would pay the same
punitive $70,000 under the current married filing separate option since
that option reduces the 20% bracket to just $100,000. In this case, Tim
and Dan would owe $35,000 each for a $70,000 total.11 Our married
calculated separate (MCS) option would raise the separate income
allowance above $100,000 to $140,000, for example. If so, Tim and Dan
would together owe only $62,000 tax (calculated as $31,000 each),12 a
much lower penalty.
In addition, our MCS approach would not expand marital bonuses.
This favorably contrasts with proposed increases to the joint bracket
allowances. To see this, consider uneven-earners Mary and Ann where
Mary earns all of the couple’s $300,000 income. If they cohabitate,
Mary would pay $75,000 tax since only half the income qualifies for the
lower 20% rate.13 But marriage would decrease their tax to $70,000, for
a $5,000 bonus.14 Importantly, our approach would not expand this
bonus since Mary and Ann should still use the regular joint bracket
allowances.15 Contrast now alternative penalty relief in the form of a
higher $280,000 joint allowance. This would provide the same penalty
relief to Tim and Dan as provided by our approach.16 However, this
higher $280,000 joint allowance would increase Mary and Ann’s marital
bonus by $8,000.17

10. As a married couple, they would report $300,000 aggregate income, only $200,000 of which
would qualify for the lower 20% rate. ($200,000 x 20%) + ($100,000 x 30%) = $70,000.
11. The separate $100,000 bracket equals half the joint $200,000 allowance. As such, each would
owe ($100,000 x 20%) plus ($50,000 x 30%), equal to $35,000.
12. Each would have $140,000 taxed at 20% ($28,000) plus $10,000 taxed at 30% ($3,000).
13. As an unmarried individual, only $150,000 of her income qualifies for the lower 20% rate; the
remaining $150,000 is taxed at the 30% rate. ($150,000 x 20%) + ($150,000 x 30%) = $75,000.
14. This is the same calculation as for married Tim and Dan with the $200,000 joint allowance.
See supra note 10. Recall how married couples with the same aggregate earnings pay the same tax
with joint returns regardless of the earnings breakdown.
15. Our new option to calculate separately would increase their tax. By calculating jointly, this
couple’s tax bill would stay at the $70,000 amount calculated above for them (with $200,000 taxed
at the lower rate). By taking our option, though, their tax would increase, since only $140,000 total
would qualify for the lower rate since all the income is earned by just one spouse.
16. Each individual would have $140,000 taxed at the lower 20% rate under our approach, equal
to $280,000 in the aggregate. See supra note 11.
17. By calculating jointly, Mary and Ann’s tax bill would drop to the same $62,000 as Tim and
Dan since (i) $280,000 of the income would qualify for the lower 20% rate, with (ii) only $20,000
subject to the higher 30% rate. This would increase the bonus from $5,000 ($75,000 – $70,000) to
$13,000 ($75,000 – $62,000). This results because marriage allowed an additional $130,000 of
income ($280,000 – $150,000) to qualify for a 10% lower tax rate (20% rather than 30%).
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Our discussion proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the origins of the
joint return, demonstrating the linkage of joint returns to marriage
penalties and bonuses. This Part also explains how current law resolves
the tension between marital penalties and bonuses.
In Part II, we first trace the same-sex marriage developments over
time, culminating with the recent Windsor and Obergefell decisions.18
We next discuss how these recent opinions revitalize the long-standing
marriage penalty issue. While some reformers propose eliminating joint
returns in response to recent events,19 we demonstrate why this lacks
viability as a reform option. By excising all current bonuses, this reform
approach undercuts the general policy of encouraging marriage and the
propriety of a tax reduction for certain married couples. On the practical
side, eliminating joint-returns presents transitional and political
roadblocks.20 We show that recent developments support instead a more
targeted reform approach limited to just marriage penalties.
In Part III, we consider three prior proposals that share our vision of
marital penalty relief without the elimination of all marital bonuses. One
approach would double the singles tax brackets for even-earner
spouses.21 Another approach would permit married couples to file taxes
as if they were single.22 Finally, former presidential candidate Jeb
Bush’s intriguing approach combines (i) separate return filing for the
low-earner’s wages with (ii) joint return filing for the remaining marital
income (including all investment income).23 We demonstrate the serious
shortcomings of these three proposals.

18. Obergefell v. Hodges, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); United States v. Windsor,
__ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
19. See Kahng, Not-So-Merry Wives, supra note 8; Kahng, Marriage Tax Hurts, supra note 8;
Murray & Ventry, supra note 8.
20. As a recent indication of this, note that most of the 2016 presidential candidates oppose the
marriage penalty, but no candidate has proposed elimination of joint returns. See infra note 25.
21. Margaret Ryznar, An Easy Solution to the Marriage Penalty, PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2643832 [https://perma.cc/24CS-MF5H].
22. H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); S. 1314, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997). For discussion of this
proposal, see Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1, 11–21 (2000).
23. See JOHN COGAN, ET AL., FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: AN ESSENTIAL PILLAR OF
ECONOMIC GROWTH: AN ASSESSMENT OF GOVERNOR JEB BUSH’S “REFORM AND GROWTH ACT OF
2017” (Sept. 9, 2015), http://thecge.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Fundamental-Tax-Reform-AnEssential-Pillar-of-Economic-Growth1.pdf [https://perma.cc/74P5-JPBF]; LEN BURMAN, ET AL,
URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INST. TAX POL’Y CENTER, AN ANALYSIS OF GOVERNOR BUSH’S TAX
PLAN (Dec. 8, 2015) http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/analysis-governor-bushs-tax-plan
[https://perma.cc/MF5M-A6X5].
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In Part IV, we demonstrate the superiority of our MCS approach over
these prior attempts to combine penalty relief with bonus retention. By
fully disentangling marriage penalties from marriage bonuses, our
proposal allows targeted penalty relief without any undesired impact on
bonuses. Further, our approach provides more flexibility to balance
revenue concerns and other competing values. Finally, our approach
maintains the collaborative character of joint filing by simply
aggregating each spouse’s separately determined tax on a joint return.
Our approach uses a schedule (that is, a separate form like a “Schedule
C” form used for sole proprietor business income) to determine each
spouse’s tax and then aggregates these separate amounts into a combined
total on a jointly filed marital return. We then defend our proposal
against potential critiques, and finish with some guidelines for the rate
bracket percentages at different income levels.
Part V summarizes the key arguments in favor of our divergent
treatment of marital penalties and bonuses. We then highlight how our
approach would liberate the marital decision from the distorting tax
penalty incentive to cohabitate in lieu of marriage or engage in Boyterlike legal antics.
I.

THE JOINT RETURN AND THE MARRIAGE PENALTY

Politicians and analysts have criticized the marriage penalty since its
arrival in 1969.24 In fact, many of the 2016 presidential candidates
proposed some form of penalty relief.25 This dissatisfaction is not
24. See infra text accompanying notes 27–38.
25. In late fall 2015, we surveyed the statements of most of the then nationally recognized
candidates for President of the United States on the topic. See, e.g., Tax Reform That Will Make
America Great Again, DONALD J. TRUMP, https://www.donaldjtrump.com/positions/tax-reform
[https://perma.cc/62US-HP2R] (Donald Trump); BURMAN, supra note 23 (Jeb Bush); The Jindal
Tax Reform: Everybody Has to Have Some Skin in the Game, BOBBY JINDAL,
https://www.bobbyjindal.com/policy/tax-reform/ [https://perma.cc/VA6R-W38X] (Bobby Jindal);
URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INST. TAX POL’Y CENTER, THE SANTORUM TAX PLAN (January 18,
2012), http://taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/Santorum-plan.cfm [https://perma.cc/P6GK-HC25] (Rick
Santorum); Ben Carson on Tax Reform, ON THE ISSUES, http://www.ontheissues.
org/2016/Ben_Carson_Tax_Reform.htm [https://perma.cc/G2XJ-GRSC] (Ben Carson); The Simple
Flat Tax Plan, CRUZ/FIORINA 2016, https://www.tedcruz.org/tax_plan/ [https://perma.cc/8STLTTBF] (Ted Cruz); Carly Fiorina on the Issues, ON THE ISSUES, http://www.ontheissues.
org/Carly_Fiorina.htm [https://perma.cc/NZG6-2RD8] (Carly Fiorina); Lindsey Graham on Tax
Reform, ON THE ISSUES, http://www.ontheissues.org/Economic/Lindsey_Graham_Tax_Reform.htm
[https://perma.cc/GYL7-B4J6] (Lindsey Graham); Mike Huckabee on Tax Reform, ON THE ISSUES,
http://www.ontheissues.org/celeb/Mike_Huckabee_Tax_Reform.htm
[http://perma.cc/UT7WRCEA] (Mike Huckabee); John Kasich on the Issues, ON THE ISSUES,
http://www.ontheissues.org/John_Kasich.htm [https://perma.cc/8TBX-T5J8] (John Kasich); Hillary
Clinton on Tax Reform, ON THE ISSUES, http://www.ontheissues.org/celeb/Hillary
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surprising since governments typically encourage marriage through
various benefits.26 This Part explores how we arrived at this aberrational
juncture. Section A discusses the historical origins of the penalty.
Section B defines three core tax values: progressivity, couples neutrality,
and marital neutrality. Section C next demonstrates the incompatibility
of these values. Section D explains how current law resolves this tension
among the key values.
A.

Historical Origins

The original 1913 income tax did not penalize marriage.27 At that
time, spouses were simply treated as two separate taxpayers.28 In 1918,
Congress authorized husbands and wives to make “a single joint
return.”29 Initially, there was little incentive to file jointly since the joint
brackets were the same as the singles brackets.30 In addition, there was
an incentive for many husbands to shift income to their wives under the

_Clinton_Tax_Reform.htm [http://perma.cc/9AAN-YZUT] (Hillary Clinton); Bernie Sanders on
Tax Reform, ON THE ISSUES, http://www.ontheissues.org/2016/Bernie_Sanders_Tax_Reform.htm
[https://perma.cc/Y623-HDKH] (Bernie Sanders). The other candidates’ policies were unclear as of
that time. For further discussion of the proposal of candidate Trump, see infra text accompanying
note 95. For further discussion of the proposal of former candidate Bush, see infra text
accompanying notes 118–120 & 152–157.
26. The benefits of marriage include, for example, spousal immigration assistance, spousal
testimonial privileges, social security benefits, estate tax avoidance, and veterans’ benefits. There
are over a thousand federal laws for which marital status is a factor (although not all the laws in
which marital status is a factor actually benefit married couples). See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT (2004),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9HA-26Y4] (updating GAO/OGC97-16, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT (1997), http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/og97016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F4LB-29SV]). States have at least as many laws associated with being married. In
New York, for example, statutes and regulations confer over 1300 legal rights and duties on married
individuals. See EMPIRE STATE PRIDE AGENDA & NEW YORK CITY BAR ASS’N, 1324 REASONS FOR
MARRIAGE EQUALITY IN NEW YORK STATE (2007), http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/marriage
_v7d21.pdf [https://perma.cc/SSD9-RLPG].
27. This discussion is to some extent drawn from Carlton Smith & Edward Stein, Dealing with
DOMA: Federal Non-Recognition Complicates State Income Taxation of Same-Sex Relationships,
24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 29, 37–40 (2012); see also Zelenak, supra note 8, at 344–48.
28. See Boris Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1399–
414 (1975).
29. Federal Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 223, 40 Stat. 1057, 1074 (providing, in part, “If a
husband and wife living together have an aggregate net income of $2,000 or over, each shall make
such a return unless the income of each is included in a single joint return.”).
30. See Smith & Stein, supra note 27, at 37–38. As noted therein, there was one tax rate schedule
insofar as regular taxes and surtaxes are combined.
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progressive rate structure. Since the husband typically had most of the
income, such shifted income would get taxed at a lower rate.31
In 1930, the Supreme Court held that a husband’s earned income
could not be shifted to his wife in a common law separate property
jurisdiction.32 Shortly thereafter, however, the Court held that a wife
properly reported half her husband’s income in a community property
jurisdiction.33 These two cases created a significant interstate tax
asymmetry. Couples with the same income had very different tax bills
depending on whether they lived in a community or separate property
jurisdiction. Some separate property jurisdictions responded by
(temporarily, as it turns out) embracing some form of community
property laws.34
Congress expanded the income splitting benefits to all married
taxpayers in 1948.35 Under the 1948 changes, the married joint brackets
equaled twice the single brackets.36 In 1969, Congress expanded the
singles tax brackets to 60% of the married joint brackets.37 In light of the
1969 changes, the marriage penalty emerged.38
B.

Structural Origins

The marriage penalty originates from tension among three important
tax values. To better understand the penalty’s structural origins, this

31. For further details on this history, see, e.g., Patricia Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 806–19 (2008).
32. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 11 (1930). In a common law separate property jurisdiction, a married
person’s earnings are treated as separate, not marital, property at least so long as the couple remains
married. In a community property system, however, each spouse generally has a vested half-interest
in their income regardless of source.
33. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
34. The states that temporarily adopted the community property approach were Hawaii,
Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon and Pennsylvania. (Massachusetts and New York seriously
considered doing so as well.) See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 28, at 1411–12. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court declared its state’s community property law unconstitutional. Wilcox v. Penn.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 55 A.2d 521 (Penn. 1947). After the Revenue Act of 1948 was passed, the
legislatures in the remaining five states repealed their community property laws. See, e.g., Note,
Epilogue to the Community Property Scramble: Problems of Repeal, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 332, 332–
33 (1950).
35. This eliminated the unequal treatment to married taxpayers in separate property jurisdictions.
Federal Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 303, 62 Stat. 110, 115 (“A husband and wife may make a
single return jointly of income taxes under subtitle A, even though one of the spouses has neither
gross income nor deductions.”). This is currently provided for at I.R.C. § 6013(a) (2012).
36. Federal Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 301, 62 Stat. 110, 114 (1948).
37. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91–172, § 803, 83 Stat. 487, 678–85 (1969).
38. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 28, at 1429–31; Zelenak, supra note 22, at 5–6.
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section sets forth the three mutually exclusive values: progressivity,
couples neutrality, and marital neutrality.39
1.

Progressivity

A flat income tax rate stays constant regardless of the reported
income amount. In contrast, progressive tax rates increase at higher
income levels.40 Progressivity generally rests on the diminishing
marginal utility of money: the value of money decreases as the owner’s
wealth increases.41 Wealthier taxpayers should thus pay a higher
percentage of their earnings, and not just a higher amount based on the
same flat percentage. For instance, assume that Richie has twice as much
income as Lowell: $200,000 versus $100,000. Richie would pay twice as
much tax as Lowell under a flat 20% rate: $40,000 versus $20,000.42 But
Richie would pay more than twice as much as Lowell under a
progressive rate structure of 20% up to $100,000 income, and 30%
thereafter: $50,000 versus $20,000.43
2.

Couples Neutrality

Couples neutrality provides that married couples with identical joint
incomes should pay the same tax regardless of the earnings breakdown
between the spouses. Proponents of couples neutrality argue that married
couples tend to share their resources equally regardless of source.44
Furthermore, married couples generally have a mutual duty of support

39. See, e.g., MICHAEL GRAETZ & DEBORAH SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES
POLICY 451–52 (7th ed. 2013); Alstott, supra note 8, at 705; Zelenak, supra note 22, at 6–7;
Bittker, supra note 28, at 1396.
40. For historical data on progressivity from 1862 to 2013, see TAX FOUNDATION, Federal
Individual Income Tax Rates Adjusted for Inflation, http://www.scribd.com/doc/190500966/FederalIndividual-Individual-Income-Tax-Rate-Adjusted-for-Inflation [https://perma.cc/YLH3-STMF].
41. See, e.g., WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE
TAXATION (1953). Some progressive arguments rest instead on other principles such as equality of
opportunity. See, e.g., Mitchell Engler, Progressive Consumption Taxes, 57 HASTINGS L. J. 55
(2005).
42. Richie’s tax equals $200,000 x 20%, while Lowell’s equals $100,000 x 20%.
43. Richie’s tax increases to $50,000: ($100,000 x 20%) + ($100,000 x 30%).
44. Jessica Hardie & Amy Lucas, Economic Factors and Relationship Quality Among Young
Couples: Comparing Cohabitation and Marriage, 72 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1141, 1143 (2010)
(“Furthermore, married couples typically manage their resources jointly, allowing them to adjust to
changing economic circumstances, whereas cohabiting partners are less likely to pool their
income.”).
AND
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under common law and some state family expense statutes.45 Further
note how joint returns achieve couples neutrality by aggregating each
spouse’s income. This links to another couples neutrality virtue: the
government must police attempted income shifts by uneven-earners
absent such neutrality. To see this, recall the incentives for unevenearners to shift income to the low-earner prior to the advent of joint
returns. Couples neutrality thus eliminates the manipulation of income
reporting between spouses.46
Finally, as a practical matter, note how couples neutrality benefits
unequal-earner couples. Without couples neutrality, an uneven-earner
couple can pay more tax than an even-earner couple with the same
aggregate income.47 Couples neutrality, however, equalizes the tax
burden of the two couples.
3.

Marital Neutrality

Marital neutrality provides that marital status should not impact one’s
tax bill. This links to the broader tax efficiency principle that ideal taxes
minimize the distortion of taxpayer preferences.48 Section C below
illustrates two types of marital neutrality violations depending on
whether marriage increases (penalties) or decreases (bonuses) the
couple’s tax bill.49
Although an important tax value, marital neutrality is at odds with
family law inducements to marriage.50 In addition, “economies of scale”
arguably support a tax increase when two equal-earners marry because
they can live more cheaply together than apart.51 Likewise, the

45. See, e.g., HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
252–58 (2d. ed. 1988).
46. See supra section I.A.
47. Without couples neutrality, each couple’s taxes would be based on the individual earnings of
each spouse. As such, the high (uneven) earner could be taxed at a higher (progressive) rate.
48. This assumes that the government should generally respect taxpayer preferences. And so,
while the government has power to extract tax payments from its citizens, it generally should do so
in a manner that least impacts the pre-tax choices of citizens. But see infra note 96 and
accompanying text for a special exception where the government purposefully intends to encourage
desirable behaviors.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 102–103, where we suggest a modification to marital
neutrality that separates penalties from bonuses. This is more fully developed in section IV.A.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 95–98.
51. See e.g., Robert S. McIntyre & Michael J. McIntyre, Fixing the “Marriage Penalty”
Problem, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 908, 912–13 (1999) (setting forth, and then rejecting, such
justification). The fact that couples can achieve some economies of scale via cohabitation somewhat
undercuts this justification. Nevertheless, marriage might induce even greater economies of scale,
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additional financial responsibility arguably supports a tax decrease when
a high-earner marries a low-earner.52
Finally, as a practical matter, note how marital neutrality benefits
equal-earner couples. With marital neutrality, an even-earner couple can
pay less tax than an uneven-earner couple with the same aggregate
income.53 As noted above, the substitution of couples neutrality for
marital neutrality would equalize the tax burden of the two couples,
albeit with a loss in tax efficiency.54
C.

The Trilemma Involving Three Core Tax Values

This section demonstrates the incompatibility of the three core values,
the so-called trilemma. A progressive tax rate system cannot provide
pure couples neutrality and pure marital neutrality.55 This section further
highlights the additional tension between marital bonuses and penalties.
To illustrate these tradeoffs, consider two married couples. Eva and
Evan each earn $100,000 of income. Dina and Virgil also have $200,000
aggregate income, all earned by Dina. Further assume two rates for
singles: a 20% rate on income up to $100,000, with a 30% rate
thereafter.56 To achieve pure couples neutrality, the system must require
joint returns. This ensures that married couples with the same aggregate
income pay the same tax. For example, even-earners Eva/Evan would
pay less tax than divergent-earners Dina/Virgil without joint returns.
High-earner Dina would pay tax at the 30% rate on half of her $200,000
income, but Eva/Evan would pay tax at the lower 20% rate on all their
income. As demonstrated below, however, joint returns inevitably
violate marital neutrality in the form of marital penalties, marital
bonuses, or some combination thereof.

for example, through improved long-term planning. See also Hardie & Lucas, supra note 44 (noting
that cohabiting couples are less likely to pool resources than married couples).
52. For further development of this proposition, see infra note 91 and accompanying text.
53. With marital neutrality, each couple’s taxes would be based on the individual earnings of each
spouse. And again, the high (uneven) earner could be taxed at a higher (progressive) rate.
54. Couples neutrality undermines tax efficiency, as the act of marriage would change some
couples’ tax bills.
55. As we discuss in section IV.D, a tax system can accommodate partial couples neutrality and
partial marital neutrality as part of a more refined balancing act.
56. In actuality, our system has more than two brackets but all the key points can be more readily
exposed through such a simplified example. Other elements of our system, such as the earned
income tax credit (EITC) and the head of household filing status, complicate the issue further. See,
e.g., Zelenak, supra note 22, at 7–8. For ease of exposition, we abstract away from these
complexities. See also our discussion of the EITC in section IV.E.
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To see this, let’s now determine the joint bracket amount. Consider
first the most generous allowance of $200,000—twice the singles
amount.57 This would eliminate all penalties, as Eva/Evan would be
taxed at just the lower 20% rate on their aggregate $200,000 income.
This $200,000 bracket maximizes the bonuses, however, as evidenced
by Dina and Virgil. By marrying instead of cohabitating, Dina and Virgil
would receive a sizable tax benefit as the lower 20% rate would apply to
an additional $100,000 of their joint income.58
At the other extreme, a $100,000 joint bracket allowance would
eliminate Dina and Virgil’s bonus. But this equalization of the single and
joint brackets would subject Eva and Evan to the maximum marital
penalty. By marrying instead of cohabitating, Eva and Evan would be hit
with a sizable tax detriment: the higher 30% rate would apply to an
additional $100,000 of income.59
A third middle-ground alternative would increase the joint brackets
above the singles amount, but not all the way to $200,000. For example,
a $150,000 bracket would split the difference between the potential
penalties and bonuses.60 Eva and Evan would now face the higher 30%
rate on an extra $50,000 of income,61 while Dina and Virgil would
benefit from the lower 20% rate on an extra $50,000 of income.62 A
comparison of this alternative to the prior one illustrates the inherent
tension between penalties and bonuses. Raising the marital bracket from
$100,000 to $150,000 would cut Eva and Evan’s penalty in half. But this

57. This might be justified on grounds that a married couple aggregates the income of two
individuals.
58. If they cohabitate, $100,000 would be taxed at 20%, with $100,000 taxed at 30% (since one
single person would report $200,000). In contrast, if they marry, all $200,000 would now qualify for
the lower 20% rate.
59. If they cohabitate, each individual’s earnings of $100,000 would be taxed at 20%. But if they
marry, $100,000 would be taxed at 30% (since their aggregate $200,000 would exceed the 20%
bracket threshold of $100,000 by $100,000).
60. As discussed in greater detail below, Lawrence Zelenak, For Better and Worse: The Differing
Income Tax Treatments of Marriage at Different Income Levels, 93 N.C. L. REV. 784, 816 (2015),
suggested just such an approach as a starting assumption (subject to override in certain situations).
See infra text accompanying notes 172–174.
61. If they cohabitate, each individual’s earnings of $100,000 would be taxed at 20%. But if they
marry, $50,000 would be taxed at 30% (since their aggregate $200,000 would exceed the 20%
bracket threshold of $150,000 by $50,000).
62. If they cohabitate, $100,000 would be taxed at 20% with $100,000 taxed at 30% (since one
single person would report $200,000). But if they marry, $150,000 would now qualify for the lower
20% rate.
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also would provide a new bonus in the same amount to Dina and
Virgil.63
D.

How Current Law Resolves the Trilemma

The current joint brackets use all three of the above possibilities.
First, the lowest 10% and 15% joint brackets are twice the single
brackets.64 At the other extreme, the 33% bracket cap remains exactly
the same for single and joint returns at $411,500.65 The law moderates at
other levels with joint brackets larger than, but not twice the size of, the
singles amount. These moderate increases range from a low of 13% for
the 35% bracket to a high of 67% for the 25% bracket.66 Current law
thus trends towards bonuses at the lower brackets,67 and penalties at the
higher brackets.
63. A flat tax rate plus a refundable credit (a “demogrant”) could reconcile these values.
Zelenack, supra note 22, at 75–77. The demogrant’s limited impact at higher income levels would
create some progressivity. The effective tax rate would move closer to the stated tax rate at higher
income levels. Assume a flat 20% rate with a $10,000 demogrant and two individuals with the
following income: $100,000 (Lois), and $200,000 (Hi). Lois would owe $10,000 tax for a 10%
effective rate. [($100,000 x .2) – $10,000 demogrant = $10,000 tax.] Hi would owe $30,000 tax for
a 15% effective rate. [($200,000 x .2) – $10,000 demogrant = $30,000 tax.] Further assume that a
married couple would receive a doubled $20,000 joint demogrant and consider again our
Dina/Virgil and Eva/Evan couples. Couples neutrality exists since each couple would owe $20,000
tax on their $200,000 aggregate income. [($200,000 x .2) – $20,000 demogrant = $20,000 tax.]
Marital neutrality also exists since each couple would owe the same $20,000 total if they cohabited.
If so, Eva and Evan would each owe the same $10,000 as Lois above. With cohabitation, Dina
would owe the same $30,000 as Hi above on her $200,000 earnings while Virgil, the zero-earner,
would receive a $10,000 demogrant payment from the government. This reconciliation of the
trilemma values would require a government commitment to pay out demogrants to low-earners, a
seeming non-starter on political grounds. In addition, this approach can impose limited progressivity
since it rests solely on the demogrant. Contrast how our current system provides a variety of
changing rates over the income spectrum. See I.R.C. § 1(a) (2012). Practically speaking, the
trilemma remains intact despite this intellectually intriguing possibility.
64. As discussed above, this doubling of the singles bracket eliminates rate bracket penalties but
maximizes bonuses. For tax year 2015, the $9,225 cap on 10% Tax Rate for singles increases to
$18,450 for Married Filing Jointly. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN
2014-47, § 3 (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/irb/2014-47_IRB/ar14.html [https://perma.cc/
VD58-9H66] (table 3, sec. 1(c) and table 1, sec. 1(a)). The $37,450 cap on 15% Tax Rate for singles
increases to $74,900 for Married Filing Jointly. See id. Thus, in the 2015 tax year, there is no tax
rate penalty for a married couple that earns $18,450 or less. But see our discussion of the earned
income tax credit penalty in section IV.E.
65. See INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN 2014-47, supra note 64.
66. For tax year 2015, the $413,200 cap on 35% Tax Rate for singles increases to $464,850 for
Married Filing Jointly; the $90,750 cap on 25% Tax Rate for singles increases to $151,200 for
Married Filing Jointly. Id.
67. Note how this discussion ignores EITC issues to focus on the broader rate bracket issues.
EITC issues are considered below. See infra text accompanying note 190 (highlighting how our
married calculated separate approach can easily address EITC issues as well).

07 - Engler & Stein.docx (Do Not Delete)

2016]

10/4/2016 5:10 PM

MARRIAGE PENALTY RELIEF

1087

Finally, current law permits married couples to file separate returns,
but this option does not allow them to avoid the penalty. This results
because the married filing separate (MFS) brackets are simply half the
joint allowances, rather than the full singles amounts.68
In sum, current law favors couples neutrality over marital neutrality.
Furthermore, the current approach unfortunately links penalty relief to
bonus expansion, limiting the flexibility for change.
II.

IMPACT OF THE RECENT SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
DEVELOPMENTS

The extension of marital rights to same-sex couples impacts the
classic marital tax analysis above. Section A traces same-sex marriage
developments over time. Section B discusses why these developments
revitalize the long-standing marriage penalty issue. Because proponents
of change often target the elimination of joint returns, section C explains
why such elimination is not a viable reform option.
A.

Same-Sex Marriage Developments Have Renewed the Penalty
Relief Debate

This section sets the stage by tracing the same-sex marriage
developments over time. In 2003, Massachusetts became the first state to

68. Thus, a married couple cannot file separately to escape the same 33% bracket cap ($411,500)
for joint and single returns because the MFS cap is just $205,750 (i.e., half of $411,500). Currently,
married couples should only use the MFS status in limited cases such as where one spouse has all
the couple’s unreimbursed medical expenses (allowable under I.R.C. § 213 only to the extent above
10% of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income). Even then, the extra deduction must be balanced by
the potential higher rate where the spouses have uneven earnings. Assume a 20% rate bracket cap of
$100,000 for singles and $150,000 for joint returns (with a 30% rate thereafter). The MFS bracket
equals just $75,000 (i.e., half of $150,000). Consider Evan and Eva, each with $150,000 income. If
they marry and file jointly, a $5,000 marriage penalty arises since only $150,000 would qualify for
the lower 20% rate, rather than the $200,000 if they just cohabited. (This $50,000 shortfall generates
an extra $5,000 tax when multiplied by a 10% higher tax rate.) The MFS option provides no relief
since the 20% rate still would apply to just $150,000 in total ($75,000 each). MFS might make
sense for them, though, if Evan had all of the couple’s $30,000 qualified medical expenses. If Evan
and Eva file a joint return, none of the unreimbursed medical expenses would qualify for the
deduction since the $30,000 does not exceed the 10% threshold. Filing separately, though, might
liberate some of the medical expenses, since the $30,000 could exceed the 10% threshold based
solely on Evan’s income. Any such deduction liberation must be balanced against potential rate
increases if the spouses have uneven income. To see this, ignore the medical expenses and assume
Evan generated all of the couple’s $300,000 aggregate income. A separate filing would be adverse
as only $75,000 would qualify for the lower 20% rate. For further discussion of the limitations of
MFS, see David Mitchell, An Unhappy Union: Married Taxpayers Filing Separately and the
Affordable Care Act’s Premium Tax Credit, 69 TAX L. 453 (2016).
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allow same-sex marriages.69 By 2012, six states and the District of
Columbia had legalized same-sex marriage and another nine states
allowed same-sex civil unions or domestic partnerships.70 Although
same-sex couples in these states could file joint state income tax
returns,71 they could not file joint federal tax returns72 because the
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) defined marriage as between
one man and one woman.73 The Supreme Court struck down this portion
of DOMA in Windsor v. United States,74 thereby allowing married samesex couples to file joint federal returns. After Windsor, however, some
states still refused to solemnize same-sex marriages or even to recognize
same-sex marriages from other states.75
The Supreme Court eliminated these inconsistencies in Obergefell v.
Hodges. Obergefell held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment required all states to allow same-sex marriages.76 In holding
that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry, the Court
discussed “four principles and traditions . . . demonstrat[ing] that the
reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal
force to same-sex couples.”77 These principles are: “the right to personal
choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual

69. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). For a history of the quest
for same-sex marriage equality before Goodridge, see, e.g., Edward Stein, The Story of Goodridge
v. Department of Public Health: The Bumpy Road to Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, in FAMILY
LAW STORIES 27 (Carol Sanger, ed., 2007).
70. Edward Stein, The Topography of Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships, 50 FAM. CT.
REV. 181, 181 (2012).
71. Smith & Stein, supra note 27, at 48–52.
72. See id. at 41–46. As discussed therein, this created a peculiar situation whereby a married
same-sex couple was required to file state taxes as a married couple but had to file federal taxes as a
single person.
73. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738C (2012)).
74. United States v. Windsor, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013). The facts of Windsor are
as follows: Edith Windsor, whose same-sex spouse had passed away, was required to pay estate tax
on her wife’s estate because, due to DOMA, the federal government did not recognize same-sex
marriages. Windsor would not have had to pay any estate tax had she been married to a man (or if
she was a man and her spouse was a woman).
75. This created a reverse peculiarity where some married couples who filed joint federal returns
had to file separately for state purposes. See, e.g., Haniya H. Mir, Note, Windsor and Its
Discontents: State Income Tax Implications for Same-Sex Couples, 64 DUKE L. J. 53, 74–77 (2014);
Aaron M. Bernstein, Note, Are We Married? State Tax Filing Problems After Windsor, 90 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 207 (2015).
76. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2602.
77. Id. at 2599.
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autonomy”;78 “the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a
two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed
individuals”;79 “the right to marry . . . safeguards children and families
and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation,
and education”;80 “marriage is a keystone of our social order” and “[f]or
that reason, . . . society pledge[s] to support the couple, offering
symbolic recognition and material benefits to protect and nourish the
union.”81
The Court’s four principles further develop the idea of marriage as a
fundamental right.82 As we argue below, Obergefell, in contrast to what
some commentators have said, does not support the elimination of the
joint return; in fact, Obergefell supports both penalty relief and the
retention of the joint return. As part of our discussion, we highlight, for
instance, how the tax law frequently provides beneficial tax results in
furtherance of societal goals.83
B.

Obergefell Renews Call for Marital Penalty Relief

This section explains why Obergefell and Windsor have led to
renewed calls for marital penalty relief, often through joint return
elimination.84 First, Obergefell has placed the penalty back in the
spotlight because more couples can now marry. Relatedly, same-sex
couples seem more likely to face the marriage penalty. As discussed

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2600.
81. Id. at 2601.
82. The Supreme Court, in its landmark 1967 decision in Loving v. Virginia, held that “[m]arriage
is one of the basic civil rights of man” (quotation omitted) and that “[t]he freedom to marry has long
been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.” 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). Between Loving and Obergefell, the two most important cases on
the fundamental right to marry are Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) and Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78 (1987).
83. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Margaret Ryznar, Fixing the Marriage Penalty, HUFFINGTON POST, (Oct. 14, 2015,
12:21 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/margaret-ryznar/fixing-the-marriage-penal_b_8290820
.html [https://perma.cc/QN7C-ASC4] (noting that problematic marriage penalty has impacted even
more couples after Obergefell); Kahng, Not-So-Merry Wives, supra note 8 at 383 (“However,
Windsor, and now Obergefell, will fail to deliver on the promise of tax equality unless we relinquish
the fiction of marital unity”). Kahng, Marriage Tax Hurts, supra note 8; Murray & Ventry, supra
note 7; Ed McCaffery, The Marriage Penalty Was Never Fair, and Is Now Just Silly, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 14, 2013, 7:01 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/04/14/improving-on-thetax-codes-marriage-penalty/the-marriage-penalty-was-never-fair-and-is-now-just-silly
[https://
perma.cc/T5YR-QB2Y].
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above, the marriage penalty primarily impacts relatively even-earner
couples.85 Note that gender tends to correlate with income. For full-time
employment, at least, men generally earn more than women. 86 Further, a
greater percentage of men work as compared to women: approximately
70% versus 57%.87 These gender disparities suggest that same-sex
spouses are more likely to earn similar amounts. Two studies lend
further support on grounds that same-sex relationships are more likely to
have two wage earners.88
Separately, Obergefell challenges the propriety of penalizing the
fundamental right to marriage. Recall, for instance, the Court’s fourth
principle that “marriage is a keystone of our social order” and “[f]or that
reason, . . . society pledge[s] to support the couple, offering symbolic
recognition and material benefits to protect and nourish the union.”89
Significant marital tax increases directly contradict this principle.
C.

Penalty Relief by Excising Joint Returns?

Given Obergefell’s impetus for penalty relief, how should our tax
system implement such change? As noted above, some reformers
propose the elimination of the joint return as the appropriate response.
Joint return elimination (JRE) appeals initially, as it removes all
penalties and bonuses. JRE achieves pure marital neutrality since
marriage would not impact one’s tax bill. Rather, all individuals would
pay the same tax regardless of their marital status.

85. See supra text accompanying notes 2–3.
86. For example, according to a United States Bureau of Labor Statistics report in 2013, on
average, women working full time in the United States earned 82% of what men working full time
in the United States earned. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN
THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 1 (Dec. 2014), http://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/cps/women-inthe-labor-force-a-databook-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL4X-59FA].
87. Id.
88. See GARY J. GATES, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, SAME-SEX AND DIFFERENT-SEX COUPLES IN
THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY: 2005–2011 (2013), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wpcontent/uploads/ACS-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/QHM8-VHM2]; James Alm et al., Revisiting the
Income Tax Effects of Legalizing Same-Sex Marriages, 33 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 263
(2014). Further, a study of the U.S. Census Bureau published in 2012 indicates that unmarried
same-sex couples are more likely to both be earning income compared to married different-sex
couples. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CHARACTERISTICS OF SAME SEX HOUSEHOLDS: 2012 (2012),
www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/files/ssex-tables-2012.xls [https://perma.cc/C2WC-2HVH]. This
same study shows that unmarried same-sex couples earn more on average than married different-sex
couples. Based in part on these two studies, Lily Kahng has argued that couples consisting of two
women are more likely than other couples to be subject to the marriage penalty. Kahng, Not-SoMerry Wives, supra note 8, at 337–43.
89. Obergefell v. Hodges, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015).
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Despite this initial appeal, we believe that JRE fails as an appropriate
reform for five reasons. As developed more fully below, the first four
reasons stem from JRE’s termination of all current bonuses: transitional
concerns, political viability, the desire to encourage marriage, and the
propriety of a tax reduction for certain married couples. Finally, we
show why Obergefell and Windsor generally strengthen, rather than
weaken, the case for marriage as a relevant tax factor.
1.

Bonus Elimination Concerns

Consider first the concerns related to bonus elimination. A tax
reduction for highly uneven-earner couples appeals under the income
tax’s “ability to pay” norm.90 Taxes are based on income because one’s
ability to pay correlates with income. Recall married couple Dina and
Virgil, where Dina earned all of the couple’s $200,000 income. Let’s
compare Dina to Ingrid, an unmarried individual who also earns
$200,000. All else equal, Dina has a lesser ability to pay than Ingrid
since Dina’s $200,000 supports two individuals.91 JRE disregards Dina
and Virgil’s resource sharing—a complete rejection of couples
neutrality.
Two practical concerns bolster the theoretic support above for joint
return retention. First, transition issues arise because the current system
has provided significant tax reductions for many years. For instance,
some taxpayers may have previously married based in part on ingrained
marital bonuses. JRE would strip the marital benefit from those who
married with such benefit in place.92 Somewhat related, JRE raises

90. Reasoning conversely, marriage penalties likewise might seem justified for equal-earning
couples due to economies of scale. See supra note 51 and text accompanying notes 51–52. While
there is some truth to this proposition, marriage penalties raise separate concerns. Recall for
instance the discussion in section II.B about how Obergefell opposes a tax charge on the exercise of
the fundamental marriage right.
91. Of course, marriage may provide non-pecuniary benefits to those who marry that could offset
the marriage penalty. That said, the tax code, for better or worse, generally assesses taxes based on
economic factors. Consider, for example, a highly compensated lawyer who leaves the practice of
law for a teaching job in academia because the academic job provides greater personal satisfaction.
The tax code nonetheless taxes the practicing lawyer more heavily than the law teacher.
92. As noted above, disproportionate-earner couples receive bonuses. See supra section II.C.
While tax law changes are always part of the landscape (e.g., tax rate shifts over time), a complete
elimination of bonuses without any transitional relief seems more problematic (e.g., from a tax
planning perspective). For a general discussion of tax transitional policy issues, see, e.g., Michael
Doran, Legislative Compromise and Tax Transition Policy, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 545 (2007).
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political feasibility issues. It seems highly unlikely that Congress would
excise all tax marital bonuses, a seemingly anti-marriage position.93
These transitional and political concerns link to an incentive-based
argument for tax bonuses. Obergefell emphasizes marriage’s long-term
value for couples and their children.94 This provides additional theoretic
support for retention of marital tax bonuses: a tax incentive to undertake
an activity with long-term benefits.95 The tax code provides such
inducements in a number of areas, such as retirement savings tax
breaks.96 This closely aligns with Carl Schneider’s influential article on
the channeling function of family law.97 Governments provide many
non-tax benefits designed to encourage marriage.98 In this spirit, tax
bonuses tend to benefit divergent-earner couples like Dina and Virgil.
Such a tax bonus might offset the potential reluctance of a high-earner
like Dina to commit to a marriage.
2.

Obergefell Strengthens Case for Marriage as Tax Proxy

Obergefell and Windsor also support joint return retention for another
reason. Under prior law, same-sex couples could not access the marital

93. Recall how all the 2016 presidential candidates’ reform proposals maintain joint return filing.
See supra note 20.
94. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (“Marriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely
person might call out only to find no one there. It offers the hope of companionship and
understanding and assurance that while both still live there will be someone to care for the other.”);
id. at 2600–01 (“Excluding same-sex couples from marriage thus conflicts with a central premise of
the right to marry. Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, their
children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer the
significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated through no fault of their
own to a more difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws at issue here thus harm and
humiliate the children of same-sex couples.”).
95. In this same spirit, continued joint filing might support valuable financial collaboration. See
infra discussion in Part III.B and Part IV.C. To this extent, we have highlighted a sixth adverse
factor of JRE.
96. These tax benefits are referred to as “tax expenditures” under the framework developed by
Stanley Surrey and Paul McDaniel. See generally STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES (1985). One might wonder why the tax system should incentivize behavior in one’s
self interest. State paternalism can be justified because individuals do not always act in their own
long-term interests. Also, parents do not always act to further their child’s interests. A focus on
children’s interests might suggest marital benefits just for couples with children, or more radically, a
refocusing of family law on the nurturing relationship, as suggested by Martha Fineman. See, e.g.,
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995). Perhaps, though, we might want to encourage marriage
for childless couples to increase their willingness to parent together.
97. Carl Scheider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV 495 (1992).
98. See supra note 26.
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tax benefit available to heterosexual couples.99 Such unequal access
presented a fairness challenge to the use of marriage as a tax factor. But
Obergefell and Windsor erased this discrimination critique. Marriage
may not be a perfect proxy for joint taxation of individuals on resourcesharing grounds,100 but it now operates as a much improved tax proxy
after Obergefell.101 This counters the JRE claim that marriage should no
longer be a tax factor after Obergefell.
3.

Summary

Obergefell influences the marital penalty debate in two ways. First, it
solidifies the use of marriage as a relevant tax factor by eradicating a
discriminatory impact on same-sex couples. Through its “marriage as a
fundamental right” analysis, Obergefell also justifies a new split
approach to the two marriage neutrality components. Current reform
efforts should target marital penalties but not marital bonuses since
government policy should incentivize, rather than discourage,
marriage.102 Transitional and political concerns further support this new
bifurcated approach to marriage neutrality.103
III. PENALTY RELIEF PROPOSALS
Thus far, we have made the case for marital penalty relief without the
simultaneous elimination of all marital bonuses. Section II.C highlighted
one way to accomplish that goal: expand the joint brackets to twice the

99. See, e.g., Smith & Stein, supra note 27 at 30.
100. In fact, some cohabiting couples might share resources at least as much as some married
couples. Further, people in group “marriages” (that is, when three or more individuals are together
in a marriage-like relationship) may share resources as least as much as married couples. These
relationships are not legally recognized, however. For a detailed discussion of group and plural
marriages, see RONALD C. DEN OTTER, IN DEFENSE OF PLURAL MARRIAGE 251–54 (2015). See
contra JOHN WITTE, JR., THE WESTERN CASE FOR MONOGAMY OVER POLYGAMY (2015). See also,
Edward Stein, Plural Marriage, Group Marriage and Immutability in Obergefell v. Hodges and
Beyond, 84 UMKC L. REV. 871 (2016).
101. While not related to Obergefell, further note how marriage is a more readily identifiable
marker for resource sharing than cohabitation. For a discussion of the discrimination critique prior
to Obergefell, see e.g., Patricia Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal Revenue Code, 34
U.S.F. L. REV. 465 (2000).
102. Thus, we ultimately advocate a proposal that severs penalty reduction from bonus
elimination. Ryznar, supra note 20, similarly favors penalty relief without bonus elimination. For
discussion of Ryznar’s proposal, see infra text accompanying notes 111–117.
103. This ignores for the moment, the adverse revenue implications of such a split approach.
Revenue concerns will be addressed below. See infra section III.B.
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singles amount.104 In fact, Donald Trump has proposed this exact form
of penalty relief as part of his presidential candidacy.105 But section II.C
also highlighted an undesirable side effect: the significant simultaneous
increase of the current marital bonuses. This creates significant revenue
concerns due to the dual loss from both penalty relief and bonus
expansion.106 And while Part III made the case for bonus retention, it did
not necessarily support such a dramatic increase to the current bonus
levels.
Is there then a way to provide penalty relief without the revenue loss
associated with bonus expansion? This Part considers three proposals in
this spirit.107 Section A considers Margaret Ryznar’s recent refined
doubled-bracket approach that grants the doubled brackets to just evenearner couples.108 While this proposal has some intriguing features, it
suffers from an undesirable cliff effect.109
Section B reviews a 1997 legislative proposal. This “optional singles
filing” approach would have permitted married couples who file
separately to use the regular singles brackets rather than just half the
joint bracket. Despite its initial appeal, its unbridled penalty relief
maintains revenue and other concerns.110
Section C then examines former presidential candidate Jeb Bush’s
hybrid approach that would tax (i) the wages of the lower-earning
spouse under the separate singles brackets, and (ii) the couple’s
remaining income under the regular joint brackets. While this approach
also intrigues, we show how it provides overly generous allowances.

104. See supra text accompanying notes 57–58.
105. See Donald Trump’s proposal, supra note 25 (narrowing the number of brackets and then
providing a doubled amount for joint returns). See also Bobby Jindal’s proposal and Rick
Santorum’s proposal, supra note 25.
106. Note the extreme focus today on revenue implications as evidenced by the inability to excise
the alternative minimum tax despite widespread dissatisfaction with its application. See, e.g., Aviva
Aron-Dine, Revenue Losses from Repeal of the Alternative Minimum Tax Are Staggering, CENTER
ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, (Feb. 1, 2007), http://www.cbpp.org/research/revenue-lossesfrom-repeal-of-the-alternative-minimum-tax-are-staggering [https://perma.cc/QGX2-FXPB].
107. We focus on these proposals as we are not aware of any other penalty relief proposals that
also satisfy our goal of bonus retention without significant bonus expansion.
108. The goal is to limit the relief to just those who suffer the most egregious marriage penalties.
See Ryznar, supra note 21.
109. As discussed below, it also maintains some undesirable entanglement of penalty relief with
bonus expansion.
110. Of the three prior proposals considered in this Part, we believe this one comes closest to the
mark. As discussed in section III.B and Part IV, however, we believe we can improve upon this
proposal. In particular, our alternative approach better balances revenue concerns and a desire to
maintain the collaborative aspect of joint filing.
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Refined Doubled Bracket

Ryznar’s recent proposal offers a refined version of doubled brackets
in order to “alleviate[] the current marriage penalty . . . [without]
creating an even bigger marriage bonus” for uneven-earner couples.111
More specifically, Ryznar proposes doubling the brackets but only for
(roughly) equal-earner couples. To qualify for the doubled brackets, the
lower-earner spouse would have to earn a designated percentage of the
couple’s aggregate income, somewhere in the 30%–40% range.112 This
proposal has some initial appeal as it (i) eliminates the most extreme
marriage penalties, (ii) maintains the current bonuses, and (iii) does not
provide new bonuses for highly uneven earners. Despite such initial
appeal, Ryznar’s proposal suffers from a serious cliff effect, namely it
ends abruptly. Specifically, as illustrated below, Ryznar’s cliff effect is
the abrupt loss of the higher bracket allowance when the couple’s
income falls just outside the qualifying range. To see this, imagine
Ryznar’s low-earner qualifying threshold is set at 35%.113 Again, assume
the following brackets for the lower 20% rate: $100,000 for singles, and
$130,000 for married couples. Finally, consider married couple Lois and
Heidi, where Lois earns $60,000 of the joint $200,000 income. Since
Lois earns just 30% of their income, Lois and Heidi would be denied any
relief from their $3,000 marital penalty.114 As further demonstrated in a
comparison to our alternative proposal below, the cliff effect problem is
not so much the lack of any penalty relief to Lois and Heidi. Rather,
small shifts in the reported income allocation between the spouses could
generate disproportionately large shifts in their tax bill.115 And while
lowering the threshold to 30% would protect Lois and Heidi, the cliff
effect would persist for couples just below the 30% threshold.
In addition to its undesirable cliff effect, Ryznar’s approach would
still provide some undesired new bonuses. For example, a lower 30%
threshold would not only eliminate Lois and Heidi’s penalty, but it
111. Ryznar, supra note 21, at 22.
112. Id. at 23.
113. This splits her 30–40% suggested range.
114. Lois and Heidi still must pay the higher 30% tax rate on $70,000 of their marital income, the
excess of the joint $200,000 income over the regular joint allowance of $130,000. They would pay
the higher rate on just a lower $40,000 if they cohabited instead (the excess of the high-earner’s
$140,000 over the $100,000 singles amount). Further note how the penalty amount would increase
if the regular joint bracket amount was set at less than 130% of the singles bracket (which occurs
currently at higher levels); and would decrease if the regular joint bracket amount was set at more
than 130% of the singles bracket (which occurs currently at lower bracket levels).
115. See infra discussion at note 151 and accompanying text.
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would provide them a new $4,000 bonus. This results from the lower
20% rate applying to all their income rather than just $160,000 if they
cohabitated without marriage.116 Thus, Ryznar’s penalty relief remains
linked to bonus expansion unless it strictly requires an even 50% split.
Given these two shortcomings, we look elsewhere in our quest for
penalty relief without any bonus impact or a cliff effect.117
B.

Optional Singles Filing

Interestingly, our search takes us back to a 1997 legislative proposal
that granted married couples the option to file separately and use the
unmarried single brackets.118 On the plus side, optional singles filing
(OSF) would eliminate all penalties without any impact on bonuses or a
cliff effect. Its implementation also would be relatively
straightforward.119 Despite these significant virtues, several
shortcomings reduce its attractiveness as a reform proposal.
Most significantly, OSF removes all marital penalties, regardless of
how small. This results because any currently penalized couple simply
should take the OSF option. While such indiscriminate relief appeals in
theory, it raises practical revenue concerns. In favorable contrast, Ryznar
rations the penalty relief to just the most highly penalized couples.120 To
illustrate, recall how Ryznar’s approach would not provide any penalty
relief to Lois and Heidi.121 With OSF, Lois and Heidi could eliminate the
penalty by opting to file separately.122

116. The proposal also raises some other concerns, although these might be more easily remedied
through additional adjustments. For instance, the proposal would restore an advantage to residents
of community property states, who would more readily qualify for the doubled brackets than
residents of other states. This might be addressed by special rules that ignored community property
rules on earned income, for example. This also might invite voluntary transfers of capital income to
get the expanded bracket, although one might argue that incentivizing such transfers would be good
to do from a marital sharing perspective. This assumes that investment income would be included in
the percentage ratio (this is not clear based on our reading of Ryznar’s proposal). See infra section
IV.D for a discussion of possible solutions to the community property and capital income shifting
issues in a comparable context.
117. See infra section IV.D for a discussion of a possible modification to Ryznar’s approach that
would solve the cliff problem, albeit at a significant administrative cost.
118. H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess. 1997); S. 1314, 105th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess. 1997).
119. Taxpayers would just choose between two existing bracket calculations.
120. Although, again, it might not achieve this very efficiently due to higher bonuses as the lowearner’s qualifying percentage drops below 50%. See infra section IV.B.
121. See supra notes 114–115. Again, this assumes a 35% threshold, splitting Ryznar’s range.
122. By filing separately, $160,000 would be taxed at the lower rate ($60,000 for Lois and
$100,000 for Heidi), the same as if they just cohabitated.
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In addition, OSF also presents another less obvious concern. Separate
filing might subtly undermine the joint financial collaboration
highlighted above.123 For instance, joint returns carry joint and several
liability for the married couple.124
In sum, the OSF and Ryznar proposals contain divergent drawbacks.
OSF presents revenue concerns and a subtle undermining of the joint
planning virtue. Ryznar contains a cliff effect problem plus some
undesirable bonus-penalty linkage. Further note how each proposal
would restore two vestigial concerns from the days prior to joint
returns.125 First, community property residents would receive tax breaks
since their income generally would be shared equally.126 Second, the tax
law would encourage taxpayers in non-community property jurisdictions
to attempt such shifts through contractual sharing arrangements.127 (In
fairness to these proposals, note that the elimination of joint returns also
implicates these concerns.) With these issues in mind, we next consider
Jeb Bush’s reform proposal.
C.

Jeb Bush’s Hybrid Proposal

Jeb Bush’s proposal permits the lower wage-earner to file as a single,
but only for such spouse’s earned income.128 All other joint income
would be taxed under the regular joint return brackets. This includes the
high-earner’s wages and all of the couple’s investment income. While
this proposal also has some intriguing aspects,129 it provides unjustified
bonuses by giving dual-earner families more than twice the single
bracket amounts. This occurs because Bush’s joint brackets are larger
than the singles bracket. Thus, a dual-earner couple could receive the

123. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
124. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (2012). Married taxpayers who file separately do not have such joint and
several liability. Under joint and several liability, both spouses are each responsible for any and all
tax deficiencies attributable to either spouse. Note that there is an exception for “innocent” spouses.
I.R.C. § 6015; see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Examining Officers Guide: Innocent Spouse,
https://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-011-034.html [https://perma.cc/N337-Z5AK].
125. See supra text accompanying notes 30–33.
126. See supra section I.A.
127. Id.
128. See Jeb Bush’s tax proposal, supra note 25. Note that earned income references income from
labor efforts (e.g., wages), as opposed to investment income (e.g., dividends from stock
investments).
129. See infra section IV.C.
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sum of the singles bracket amount plus the higher joint bracket
amount.130
To illustrate, assume again the following brackets for the lower 20%
rate: $100,000 for singles, and $130,000 for married couples. Consider a
married couple where Lowell earns $100,000 of wages while Hi earns
$500,000 compensation. Under Bush’s approach, $230,000 would
qualify for the lower 20% rate: $100,000 on Lowell’s separate return
plus $130,000 on the joint return. This would provide Hi and Lowell a
$3,000 windfall as only $200,000 would qualify for the lower rate if they
cohabitated.
In sum, these three existing proposals contain some intriguing aspects
but each suffers from serious drawbacks. We next demonstrate a way to
capture their benefits without their drawbacks.
IV. MARRIED CALCULATED SEPARATE APPROACH
We believe that a modified separate approach provides the best
pathway to meaningful reform. Most significantly, the separate marital
brackets generally should be higher than their current levels, but lower
than the singles amounts. This key adjustment gives greater flexibility to
better balance all the competing values.131
Section A shows how our approach neatly disentangles marital
penalties from marital bonuses. This separation allows an independent
consideration of the desired penalty relief and the optimal bonus
amounts. Section B then demonstrates why our new approach provides
better penalty relief rationing than the 1997 legislative proposal and the
Ryznar proposal. Section C discusses additional improvements to the
1997 proposal, such as the aggregation of the separate spousal tax
amounts on a joint return, a married calculated separate (MCS)
approach. Section C also considers possible variations on our main idea.
Section D next analyzes the prior criticism of the 1997 proposal for any
possible relevance to our approach. This section demonstrates how our
modifications and the current legal developments negate such relevance.
Finally, section E provides guidelines for setting the separate marital and
the regular joint bracket amounts.

130. See Martin Feldstein, A Tax Boon for Working Women: Jeb Bush’s Tax Reform Proposal
Ends the “Marriage Penalty” by Allowing Spouses to File Separately, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2015,
7:16 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-tax-boon-for-working-women-1444087005 [https://perma.
cc/G938-QZTV] (stating specifically that the couple would be able to use the joint brackets for the
remaining income).
131. These values include revenue, transitional, and political feasibility concerns.
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Disentanglement of Penalties and Bonuses

Joint return elimination would excise all bonuses in addition to
penalties, raising the variety of concerns highlighted above.132
Alternatively, higher married brackets likewise would provide penalty
relief, albeit with limited flexibility due to the corollary bonus
expansion. In favorable contrast, our MCS proposal neatly disentangles
penalties and bonuses. This provides maximum flexibility to determine
the most optimal mix of penalties and bonuses.
To set the stage, recall our earlier illustration of the inherent tension
between penalties and bonuses under the current joint return approach.133
We assumed a simple two-bracket structure for unmarried individuals
with a 20% rate on the first $100,000 of income and a 30% rate
thereafter.134 Under the current approach, marriage penalties arise absent
a $200,000 joint bracket cap for the 20% rate. Eva and Evan would face
a marital penalty at any lesser amount since each earned $100,000
separately.135 But such $200,000 allowance also would provide the
maximum $10,000 bonus to Dina and Virgil, as Dina earned all of the
couples’ $200,000 income.136 Application of the low $100,000 singles
cap to joint returns would eliminate the bonus. However, this would then
maximize Eva and Evan’s penalty at $10,000.137
The other extreme of keeping the joint 20% bracket at the same
$100,000 for singles further illustrates this inherent tension and
entanglement of marriage penalty relief with potentially undesirable
bonus expansion. This alternate end of the continuum would eliminate
132. See supra section II.C.
133. See supra section I.C illustration. Note that by the current joint return approach, we mean
joint returns without any meaningful separate returns. The current approach does allow separate
returns but without any penalty rate bracket relief since the current married filing separate brackets
are half the joint brackets, not the unmarried single amount. See supra note 68 and accompanying
text.
134. The simple two-bracket structure is assumed for ease of exposition; the conceptual points are
not altered by this simplified structure. Further, we set to the side issues related to the head of
household status in order to focus on the primary rate bracket issues. Head of household issues can
be dealt with separately after working out the primary core structural issues. For a discussion of the
head of household issue, see Zelenak, supra note 22, at 68–74.
135. This results because they could receive the lower 20% rate on a full $200,000 aggregate
income if they cohabited instead of married.
136. They would receive the benefit of the lower 20% rate on an extra $100,000 of income (i.e.,
the full amount of the singles bracket). We have set aside the seemingly unsupported possibility that
the joint return bracket should be even greater than twice the single bracket. 10% rate difference x
$100,000 = $10,000.
137. They would now face the higher 30% rate on an additional $100,000 of income if they
married. 10% rate difference x $100,000 = $10,000.
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all bonuses but only with the corollary consequence of maximizing the
penalty potential. Consider now an equal-earner couple, Larry and
Laura, who each earn $100,000 of income. They would now face the
higher 30% rate on an additional $100,000 of income if they married.
Contrast this with our MCS proposal. Penalty relief would be
provided through expanded separate married brackets. For complete
elimination, the brackets should match the unmarried single amount of
$100,000. But mindful of other concerns,138 partial relief could be
achieved by setting the bracket amount below $100,000 but above
$50,000.139 Importantly, incremental bracket increases would lessen
penalties without increasing bonuses. This disentanglement of penalties
and bonuses has several important virtues. First, such separation enables
a singular focus on the optimal amount of penalty relief unburdened by
any corollary impact on bonuses. As discussed below, the penalty relief
thus could vary at different income levels.140 Somewhat related, the
revenue loss from penalty reduction would be limited to the direct
penalty relief, without additional lost amounts from new bonuses.
In similar fashion, any desired marriage bonuses could be maintained
separately through the joint marital brackets. Again, the ideal joint
bracket amounts could be set with a singular focus on just the desired
bonus level without concern about undesirable penalties from lower
allowances. Similar to the penalty side, the bonus amount could vary at
different income levels.141 In other words, the combined system would
encourage separate calculations by potential penalty candidates and joint
calculations by potential bonus candidates.
We return to our example to illustrate these points. Assume now the
following caps for the lower 20% rate: $90,000 for the separate married
bracket and $130,000 for the joint married bracket. The $90,000 separate
bracket neatly eliminates most penalties without any bonus expansion.
To see these results, consider again our two couples: Eva and Evan, and
Dina and Virgil. Even-earners Eva and Evan should take our new option
to calculate separately since this increases the income qualifying for the
lower 20% rate from $130,000 under the joint bracket to $180,000.142
They still would face a marriage penalty as $200,000 would qualify for
138. This includes revenue concerns. See supra text accompanying note 106 and text
accompanying note 120.
139. $50,000 is half the $100,000 joint bracket that would be used if we wanted to eliminate all
bonuses under the current approach.
140. See infra section IV.E.
141. See id.
142. Each could have $90,000 taxed at the lower rate. $90,000 x 2 = $180,000.
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the lower 20% rate if they cohabited without marriage.143 Our new
separate married bracket, however, neatly reduces the penalty to just
$2,000.144 In addition, the penalty could be further limited by increasing
the bracket above $90,000 if desired after balancing all relevant factors.
Most importantly, our penalty relief does not contain any undesired
corollary bonus consequences. With the $130,000 joint bracket cap,
divergent-earners Dina and Virgil receive the same $3,000 bonus
regardless of any increases to the married filing separate bracket.145 In
similar fashion, we could change the bonus possibilities by joint bracket
adjustments without any impact on the penalties.
B.

Better Rationing of Penalty Relief

As discussed above, the 1997 legislative proposal eliminates penalties
through an option to use the singles brackets. If penalty elimination were
the only important value, this would make the most sense. Other relevant
values should, however, be taken into account. Most recently, we
focused on the revenue loss from the complete elimination of penalties,
especially if coupled with full bonus retention as under the 1997
proposal. Such revenue loss made the 1997 proposal less politically
feasible given the significant tax reduction accorded to multiple-earner
married couples, with this revenue loss then spread out amongst the
remaining taxpayers. Reaching back to the original trilemma, the 1997
proposal also gives very little weight to couples neutrality because all
couples penalized under the joint bracket would opt out and pay
different amounts based on the earnings breakdown between the two
spouses.
With these additional values in mind, rationing the penalty relief
would improve upon the 1997 proposal’s indiscriminate relief. This
seems to underlie Ryznar’s limited relief approach. But as discussed
above, Ryznar’s approach rations the relief in an uneven way due to its
cliff effect. A couple just above the qualifying line would receive full

143. Each could have $100,000 taxed at the lower rate (since the unmarried singles brackets
provides the lowered tax rate on $100,000 of income).
144. The $2,000 equals the extra 10% rate times a $20,000 shortfall. There is a $20,000 shortfall
as only $180,000 qualifies for the lower rate instead of $200,000. Note how the penalty would rise
to $7,000 under the $130,000 joint allowance without our new separate bracket of $90,000. This
would result since they would face the extra 10% tax on $70,000 additional income (as just
$130,000 would qualify for the lower rate instead of the $200,000 if they cohabitated).
145. Unmarried, the wage earner (Richard) would receive the 10% lower rate (30% less 20%) on
just $100,000 of income. By marrying, that figure increases by $30,000 to the $130,000 joint
bracket allowance. Such $30,000 multiplied by the 10% rate difference equals the $3,000 bonus.
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penalty relief and possibly a bonus as well. In contrast, the penalty
would apply with full force to a couple just below the qualifying line.
More favorably, our proposal provides more even-handed penalty relief
and avoids the entanglement of penalty relief with undesired new
bonuses.
The following example compares our proposal to Ryznar’s approach.
As before, assume a progressive rate structure for single taxpayers where
income up to $100,000 is taxed at 20% with additional income taxed at
30%. Further consider five couples with $200,000 aggregate income,
dispersed as follows: (i) extremely uneven Richard and Regina, where
Regina earns the full $200,000; (ii) highly uneven Thomas and Todd,
where Thomas earns $160,000 and Todd earns only $40,000; (iii)
moderately uneven Samantha and Sylvia, where Samantha earns
$140,000 and Sylvia earns $60,000; (iv) relatively even Martha and
Marvin, where Martha earns $120,000 and Marvin earns $80,000; and
(v) perfectly even Larry and Laura, each of whom earn $100,000.
The following table sets forth three items: (i) the marital penalty or
bonus assuming the regular joint bracket is set at $130,000 (which can
be thought of as the result under current law),146 (ii) the joint bracket
amount necessary to avoid any penalty, and (iii) the bonus if the couple
qualifies for the doubled joint bracket under Ryznar’s approach:

146. $130,000 equals 130% of the singles bracket. As discussed in section I.D, current law varies
the multiplier at different levels with a lower multiplier at the top levels.
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Table # 1
Ryznar’s Doubled-Bracket Approach
Couple

Income
Breakdown

Penalty/Bonus
with $130k Joint
Bracket

Richard/
Regina

$0/
$200,000

Joint
Bracket
to Avoid
Penalty
$30,000 x 10% = $100,000
$3,000 Bonus

Thomas/
Todd
Samantha
/Sylvia
Martha/
Marvin
Larry/
Laura

$40,000/
$160,000
$60,000/
$140,000
$80,000/
$120,000
$100,000/
$100,000

$10,000 x 10% =
$1,000 Penalty
$30,000 x 10% =
$3,000 Penalty
$50,000 x 10%
$5,000 Penalty
$70,000 x 10%
$7,000 Penalty

$140,000
$160,000
$180,000
$200,000

Bonus Under
$200,000
Joint
Bracket
$100,000 x
10% =
$10,000
$60,000 x
10% = $6,000
$40,000 x
10% = $4,000
$20,000 x
10% = $2,000
$0

This table illustrates the difficult tradeoffs under Ryznar’s approach.
Completely even Larry and Laura (at the bottom of the table) present the
most compelling case for the doubled bracket relief. They have the
highest penalty ($7,000) without relief and the doubled bracket would
not provide them any bonus. But as we move up the table, the
difficulties become more evident. If the relief applied solely to evenearners, relatively even Martha and Marvin would be left with a high
$5,000 penalty.147

147. Another couple with a $99,000/$101,000 breakdown would be left with an even higher
penalty of $6,900 (69,000 x 10%).
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In response, Ryznar relaxes the perfectly even requirement to cover
relatively even Martha and Marvin.148 But the doubled bracket relief
overshoots its mark by providing them a $2,000 bonus.149 And once
again, the line drawing problem persists as we must consider whether the
relief should extend to moderately uneven Samantha and Sylvia.150 If so,
the system would further overshoot its mark by providing Samantha and
Sylvia a larger $4,000 bonus. Finally, note how a very small shift in the
earnings could cause a much larger $7,000 change to the tax bill. A
$1,000 shift in earnings from Samantha to Sylvia would increase their
tax bill by $7,000 as they would now fall below the 30% qualifying
line.151
In sum, Ryznar’s approach raises several serious concerns. First, the
approach contains significant tipping points from its somewhat arbitrary
line drawing. Second, the approach overshoots its mark due to its
continued entanglement of bonuses and penalties. Finally, the system
must police the earnings breakdown between the spouses as small shifts
in the reported distribution could significantly impact the tax bill.
Now, favorably contrast our alternate married calculated separate
approach. Let’s assume a new separate married bracket of $90,000, set
below the $100,000 singles amount but above one-half of the joint return
amount (i.e., $65,000).

148. Martha earns 40% of the aggregate income (80,000 = 40% x $200,000).
149. One might say this is appropriate under couples neutrality, but Ryznar’s approach does not
heed couples neutrality as an absolute requirement since it does cut off other couples from the
doubled bracket.
150. They are right on the lower end of Ryznar’s 30%–40% possibilities as Samantha earns 30%
of the aggregate income (60,000 = 30% x $200,000).
151. This would leave Samantha with just $59,000 of the income, equal to just 29.5%. While the
regime could round up so that they would qualify, there still would be some (lower) line where the
small earnings shift would cause the same larger tax shift. And such small earnings shift would
reduce their joint bracket from the higher $200,000 to just the regular $130,000 bracket. If so, an
additional $70,000 would be taxed at the 30% rate, a $7,000 difference. $70,000 x (30%–20%) =
$7,000.
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Table # 2
Our Proposal for Married Filing Separate Bracket
Couple

Richard/
Regina
Thomas/
Todd
Samantha/
Sylvia
Martha/
Marvin
Larry/
Laura

Income
Penalty
Breakdown /Bonus
Under $130K
Joint Bracket
$0/
$30,000 x 10%
$200,000
= $3,000
Bonus
$40,000/
$10,000 x 10%
$160,000
= $1,000
Penalty
$60,000/
$30,000 x 10%
$140,000
= $3,000
Penalty
$80,000/
$50,000 x 10%
$120,000
= $5,000
Penalty
$100,000/
$70,0000 x
$100,000
10% = $7,000
Penalty

Penalty with
Separate
Calculation

Resulting
Bonus

0

$3,000

$10,000 x
10% =
$1,000
$10,000 x
10% =
$1,000
$10,000 x
10% =
$1,000
$20,000 x
10% =
$2,000

0

0

0

0

We first summarize the results. Under our approach, the three
intermediary couples will suffer a slight $1,000 penalty, equal to the
extra 10% rate on $10,000 of income. This results because only the first
$90,000 of the high-earner’s income qualifies for the lower 20% rate.
There is no impact on the low-earner since the entire earnings fall below
the $90,000 separate married bracket. Equal-earners Larry and Laura
suffer a higher $2,000 penalty equal to the extra 10% rate on $20,000 of
income. This results because each has $10,000 of income which falls
above the $90,000 separate married bracket but below the singles
$100,000 bracket. Nonetheless, this couple receives the largest penalty
relief under our proposal.152 Further note the lack of any unfavorable
cliff effect or entangled bonuses.
Linking back to Ryznar’s approach, our proposal provides a better
and more consistent rationing of the penalty relief. Our proposal also

152. Their penalty drops from $7,000 to $2,000, a $5,000 difference.
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avoids Ryznar’s “leaky bucket”153 problem of unintended bonus
increases with the corollary revenue loss. In favorable contrast again, our
proposal disentangles penalty relief from bonuses by adjusting the
separate married brackets rather than the joint brackets as Ryznar does.
In addition, our proposal avoids the need to police the qualifying borders
where small shifts can create much larger tax savings.
In sum, our proposal improves upon the 1997 legislative proposal and
Ryznar’s proposal by incorporating their best features and fixing their
shortcomings. Our selective penalty relief addresses revenue concerns
and political feasibility. In this regard, adjusting the separate married
brackets is a less controversial change than either the elimination of joint
returns or a new option to file as unmarried singles. Further linking to
transitional issues, our bracket adjustments could be incorporated slowly
over time.154 For instance, the separate married brackets could be
increased piecemeal over time with similar staggered decreases to the
joint bracket allowances. These incremental joint adjustments would
further address revenue concerns due to their offsetting effects. Finally,
our proposal is more consistent with couples neutrality than a complete
scrapping of joint returns.
C.

Additional Modifications

Our proposal could incorporate further improvements. For instance,
MCS could disregard community property laws. First recall how
community property law motivated the original adoption of joint returns.
Community property couples benefited under the prior separate filing
since the earned income was split between the two spouses.155 Similar
concerns might arise under our proposal as well as other reform
proposals.156 To see this, return to the earlier example with the 20% rate
153. See ARTHUR OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 91–95 (1975) (using a
leaky bucket metaphor to explain inefficient tax losses while trying achieve fair tax results).
154. While other proposals could also phase in changes over time, our proposal has the additional
flexibility to independently coordinate penalty relief with any bonus impact (e.g., by adjusting the
separate brackets before the joint brackets or vice versa).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 30–33.
156. The same issue arises under the 1997 proposal for the same reasons as under our proposal
because the income shifting would induce the ability to generate benefits by filing separate.
Consider in this regard the textual example in this paragraph with the only difference being that the
benefits would be even greater under the 1997 proposal as it would allow each spouse to use the full
singles bracket. A version of this issue also arises under Ryznar’s proposal since community
property couples could more readily qualify for her equal-earner status. Finally, joint return
elimination would restore full force this issue as it would take us back to the time prior to joint
returns.
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cap set at $130,000 for the joint bracket and $90,000 for the MCS
bracket. Compare now two highly uneven earner couples where one
spouse in each case earns all of the couples’ $200,000 income. Richard
and Regina live in a separate property state while Nancy and Nathan live
in a community property state. Nancy and Nathan would receive a tax
break compared to Richard and Regina if community property laws were
taken into account under the classic case of Poe v. Seaborn.157 If so,
Nancy and Nathan each would report $100,000 under the MCS option,
with $180,000 total taxed at the lower 20% rate.158
The response to this problem is easy enough: provide that the new
MCS brackets would ignore the impact of community property laws.159
More generally, the MCS brackets likewise could ignore other attempted
income shifts outside of community property principles. Consider, for
instance, how a separated system provides incentives to place investment
assets in the hands of the lower-earner spouse.160 In response, the tax
system could continue to tax the donor spouse on income generated from
wealth transfers to the other spouse.161
Jeb Bush’s proposal162 incorporates this notion by permitting only the
low wage-earning spouse’s actual earnings to be taxed under the single
brackets. As noted previously,163 the remainder of the couple’s income
(compensation of the high-earner plus the couple’s entire capital
income) would be taxed under the regular joint return brackets. While
this aspect is a virtue, as noted above, the proposal provides unjustified
bonuses by allowing a dual-earner family to get more than twice the
157. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
158. Under Poe, each spouse in an appropriate community property jurisdiction would report half
the earnings regardless of which spouse generated the compensation. With each spouse reporting
$100,000 separate income, Nancy and Nathan each could qualify $90,000 for the lower rate under
the MCS brackets. $90,000 x 2 = $180,000. In contrast, Richard and Regina would file jointly
without the income split, qualifying only $130,000 for the lower rate. Id.
159. Note that this would not limit the penalty relief since the community property split arises
only on the act of marriage itself (and so the results are no worse than if the couple did not marry).
160. By shifting investment income to such lower bracket spouse, the couple would report the
income more evenly (with tax savings under the progressive rate structure).
161. Since marital penalties are the impetus for the MCS brackets, the system need not open up
tax reporting gaps unrelated to such motivation for the change in law. Note that Canada, which does
not utilize joint return filing, takes this approach. See Tom McFeat, 6 Ways Income Splitting Could
Cut Your Tax Bill, CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORP. (Mar. 1, 2012, 8:40 AM),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/taxes/6-ways-income-splitting-could-cut-your-tax-bill-1.1218592
[https://perma.cc/274U-95PP]. Further note how Jeb Bush’s proposal neatly renders irrelevant such
attempted shifts on investment income (since the couple’s investment income remains aggregated
on a joint return with the separation related solely to labor income). See supra note 128.
162. See supra section III.C.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 118–120.
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single bracket amounts.164 This defect could be remedied with some
additional complexity by reducing the joint bracket allowances by the
separately reported wage income.165 In addition, revenue concerns could
be addressed by capping the separate wages bracket at less than the
singles bracket amount, just like our MCS option. Alternatively, the
system could encapsulate all this within the joint brackets by increasing
the joint bracket amount by the lower spouse’s earnings.166 In some
ways, this last idea can be seen as a neat modification to Ryznar’s
proposal, curing the cliff defect with a varying increase based on the
actual extent of the marital penalty.
With these modifications, we could support the modified Bush or the
modified Ryznar approach as possible viable alternatives to our MCS
approach. On balance, though, we still favor our proposal since it has a
significant administrative advantage over our modified Bush and Ryznar
ideas. The joint rate bracket adjustments would differ from taxpayer to
taxpayer under the modified Bush and Ryznar ideas based on the amount
of the separately reported income. This would negate the standard
practice of putting common tax tables in the tax forms for all
taxpayers.167
Finally, recall how our proposal further adjusted the 1997 legislative
proposal to maintain joint return filing even under the new separate
calculation option. This adjustment captures the joint collaborative
164. See supra text accompanying note 118.
165. Such reduction should stop once it hits the separate bracket amount. To illustrate, return to
the familiar example with a singles cap of $100,000 for the lower 20% rate, with additional amounts
taxed at 30%. Further, assume a joint bracket of $150,000 for the 20% rate (i.e., the middle ground
approach—see supra text accompanying notes 60–62). Assume a couple has total income of
$300,000: (i) the lower-earning spouse earns $100,000 of wages, (ii) the higher-earning spouse
earns $150,000 of wages, and (iii) couple has $50,000 of interest income. If they cohabitate,
$200,000 would be taxed at 20% with $100,000 taxed at 30% (i.e., each spouse would fill up the
$100,000 bracket). If they married (without Bush’s relief), they would have a penalty, as only
$150,000 would qualify for the lower 20% rate with $150,000 at the higher rate. Under Bush’s
proposal, though, $250,000 would qualify for the lower rate ($100,000 by the low-earner filing
separately; and then $150,000 on the joint return). Our suggested remedy to this defect of the Bush
proposal is to reduce the joint bracket allowance by the income reported separately (but not below
the singles bracket allowance). So on these facts, the $150,000 bracket allowance would be
decreased down to $100,000 for this couple (thereby insuring that only $200,000 total qualifies for
the lower rate). And with an eye on revenue concerns, the separate bracket could be set at $90,000
rather than $100,000.
166. But again, subject to an overall cap of twice the singles allowance (or perhaps a somewhat
lower cap, like our proposal). Also, the increase should be triggered only to the extent the lower
spouse’s earnings exceed the excess of the regular joint bracket allowance over the singles
allowance (since the regular allowance already negates the penalty to that extent).
167. In addition, note how under our modified Bush proposal, the adjustments would have to be
made for each bracket applicable to the taxpayer in question.
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virtue of both the Ryznar and Bush proposals,168 which likewise
maintain joint filing. Essentially, married couples would complete a
schedule for each spouse’s individual tax amount, providing a portion of
the overall liability (similar to the current schedule for the alternative
minimum tax liability).169 Our change to the 1997 proposal reinforces
the notion that the tax system still views the spouses as a collaborative
couple, with the MCS option providing a penalty relief safety valve.
One other viable compromise possibility would allow taxpayers the
option to pay the average of their tax bill (i) if they filed as two singles
and (ii) if they filed jointly as a married couple. This would provide a
50/50 compromise on the marital penalty by cutting it in half for all
taxpayers.170 This idea also intrigues, as it shares many of our proposal’s
attractive features. In particular, it provides even-handed penalty relief
without bonus expansion. It also avoids the varying tax table problem of
the modified Bush and Ryznar proposals. We still prefer our original
idea on balance, though, given its greater flexibility. Specifically, our
original idea allows varying penalty relief at different income levels
rather than an ironclad 50% relief across the board.171
D.

Incoherence or Compromise of Competing Values?

Lawrence Zelenak critiqued the 1997 legislative proposal on grounds
of “philosophical incoherence.”172 Since our approach shares lineage
with the 1997 proposal, we defend our MCS idea against a similar
incoherence critique. As we develop further below, our approach
provides a coherent response to the marriage penalty debate. First, the
Obergefell developments now support the seemingly inconsistent split
approach of penalty relief with bonus retention. In addition, any
approach will contain legal inconsistencies given the many conflicting
values in play. Our improvements to the 1997 proposal, however,
minimize these legal inconsistencies.
Consider first Zelenak’s coherence critique of the 1997 proposed
single filing election. Zelenak sees couples neutrality as the sole reason
168. See supra text accompanying notes 101–102 and notes 118–119.
169. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OMB No. 1545–0074 Form 6251 (2015),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f6251.pdf [https://perma.cc/84ZQ-7ENV].
170. We thank Carlton Smith for this intriguing suggestion.
171. See Part IV.E for how the optimal relief likely varies at different income levels.
172. See Zelenak, supra note 22, at 17–19; see also Easing the Family Tax Burden: Hearing
Before the S. Committee on Finance, 107th Cong. 107-170, pp. 10–12 (Mar. 8, 2001) (testimony of
Professor Zelenak), http://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/download/?id=0fc7d303-0ccf4387-a049-45b3d16abb6e [https://perma.cc/R58X-MDW4].
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for the joint return system. As such, Zelenak argues that there are only
two coherent options: (i) a joint return system without any enhanced
separate filing;173 or (ii) an elimination of joint returns.174
The current post-Obergefell environment, however, provides a
broader perspective extending well beyond couples neutrality. In one
direction, Obergefell challenges the continuation of large marital
penalties that might discourage even-earner couples from exercising the
fundamental right of marriage. But while Obergefell justifies penalty
relief, it fails to mandate a simultaneous elimination of joint returns. If
anything, Obergefell supports possible increases to the bonus aspect of
joint returns, in order to incentivize the valuable institution of
marriage.175
Beyond Obergefell, factors other than couples neutrality support
joint-return retention as part of marital penalty reform. As discussed
above, these factors include transitional concerns, political feasibility,
and the ability-to-pay norm.176 Finally, note how current law already
suffers from Zelenak’s incoherence charge. Some married couples file
separately under current law to pay less taxes than other married couples
with identical aggregate items.177 Current law thus already sacrifices
couples neutrality at times.
Our proposal provides a coherent balancing of conflicting goals. In
this regard, consider the following excerpt from a legal theorist on
coherence in the law:
[G]iven that one function of law is to settle disputes, it can never
truly be univocal in its expression of value. Since disputes
frequently arise in cases of competing values, and it is likely that
the law will need to strike a balance between those competing
concerns, it is exceedingly difficult to imagine a legal system
that articulates a perfectly consistent set of values.178
In this spirit, our approach provides maximum flexibility to balance
all the important values. Rather than fully heeding one to the complete

173. This would maintain couples neutrality.
174. This would reject couples neutrality.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 99–102.
176. As discussed above, the ability to pay norm includes the notion that a married couple living
off the one breadwinner’s salary has lesser ability to pay than a single person with the same salary.
See supra note 90–91 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
178. Kenneth Ehrenberg, Pattern Languages and Institutional Facts: Functions and
Coherences in the Law, in COHERENCE: INSIGHTS FROM PHILOSOPHY, JURISPRUDENCE AND
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 155, 164 (Michal Araszkiewicz & Jaromír Šavelka eds., 2013).
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exclusion of another, our approach presents the opportunity to reach the
optimal level for each value after taking into account the inevitable
tradeoffs. For instance, our approach relaxes the 1997 proposal’s rigid
adherence to the full single brackets. By permitting lower MCS brackets,
this provides more weight to couples neutrality, albeit with the tradeoff
of some continued marital penalties. This highlights the inevitable
tension between these two factors.179 Likewise, joint return elimination
embraces fully marital neutrality to the complete exclusion of couples
neutrality.180 We believe, however, that the best reform plan
appropriately balances all these important values, without completely
tossing some aside.
E.

Setting the Bracket Amounts

In analyzing the optimal joint bracket allowances, Zelenak
recommends an even-split presumption between bonuses and
penalties.181 Under this approach, joint brackets generally would equal
one-and-a-half times the singles amount. For instance, the 20% rate joint
bracket would equal $150,000 in our earlier example with a $100,000
singles cap.182 Zelenak would override this even-split presumption only
upon compelling evidence.183 For instance, Zelenak would apply a
higher increase at the lower income levels due to higher rates of
cohabitation with children at such income levels.184 The improved tax
treatment arguably would counteract the possible failure of these parents
to weigh fully their children’s benefit from their own marriage.
Interestingly, this low-income focus uncovers further revenue
flexibility in our approach. As discussed above, current law eliminates
tax rate penalties for low-income taxpayers through doubled joint
allowances at the lower tax rates.185 But this costs additional revenue
since these doubled joint brackets benefit all taxpayers who pass through
these lower levels, including all higher income taxpayers.186 Our
179. Lowered allowances also heed the revenue raising function.
180. It also ignores the desire to incentivize marriage and the ability-to-pay norm application to
married couples. And absent special rules of implementation, it also raises transitional concerns.
181. See Zelenak, supra note 60, at 816.
182. The singles allowance was $100,000. $100,000 x 1.5 = $150,000.
183. See Zelenak, supra note 60, at 816–17.
184. Id.
185. See supra section I.D. By doubled joint allowances, we mean joint brackets equal to twice
the singles amount.
186. To see this, recall our standard two-bracket structure with singles taxed at 20% on income
up to $100,000. If the 20% joint bracket is higher than $100,000, say $150,000, even a millionaire
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approach could provide MCS brackets equal to the singles amount with
a corresponding decrease to the joint brackets at those levels. This would
maintain the penalty avoidance for low-income taxpayers while boosting
revenue collections from high-income taxpayers.187
As an aside, another potential low-income taxpayer adjustment
concerns the earned income tax credit (EITC).188 The current EITC
contains various marital penalties stemming from its limited application
to just low-income taxpayers. Similar to the broader rate-bracket penalty
issue, the penalty arises from the current failure to double the
disqualifying (higher) income levels for married taxpayers.189 Our MCS
approach could provide a ready fix here as well: simply extend the
separate calculation option to include the EITC.190
In this section, we provide initial guidelines, rather than absolute
parameters. We take this approach mindful of our proposal’s attractive
flexibility. We hope to engage others in a fuller discussion of how to
best utilize our improved balancing mechanism.
CONCLUSION
This Article significantly contributes to the long-running marital
penalty literature. We highlight how the same-sex marriage
developments both revitalize the tax analysis and alter the traditional tax
landscape. In light of such developments, we provide an intriguing new
mechanism for determining married couples’ taxes, the new married
calculated separate (MCS) option. We also show how our approach
improves upon the current law and other penalty-relief proposals.

earner currently benefits from this higher amount because the first $150,000 of the millionaire’s
income would qualify for the lower rate.
187. If the lower brackets are doubled, a married couple with one very high earner (and a very
low or non-earner) would benefit from such bracket expansion by having more of their high-level
income taxed at the lower rate. We could alternatively remove the low-bracket benefits for highincome taxpayers by imposing even higher rates once income exceeds a high threshold. That
alternative approach (low rates on first dollars with even higher rates on later dollars) is more
distortive since the last (marginal) dollars face a higher rate. From an efficiency standpoint, it is
generally preferable to have more balanced rates. This is because the distortion expands
exponentially as the tax rate increases. See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez, Optimal Progressive Capital
Income Taxes in the Infinite Horizon Model, 97 J. PUB. ECON. 61 (2013).
188. I.R.C. § 32 (2012).
189. See I.R.C § 32(b)(2)(A), (B)(i).
190. The system might want to provide more limited EITC relief, however. For instance, the
system might want to block a billionaire’s low-earner spouse from obtaining this benefit. See
Zelenak, supra note 22, at 52–53.
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Finally, we provide guidelines for the specific applications of our
approach.
In setting the stage, we explore how recent same-sex marriage
developments transform the traditional goal of marital neutrality. Full
appreciation of marriage as a fundamental right supports the reduction of
marriage penalties but not of marriage bonuses. Recognition of the many
state marital incentives corroborates this split approach to the penalty
and bonus aspects of marital neutrality. In fact, Obergefell’s view of
marriage may even support possible increases to marriage bonuses. On
the other hand, tax revenue concerns191 caution against a combination of
lower penalties and higher bonuses, as proposed by some 2016
presidential candidates.192
Mindful of these changing parameters, we see great appeal in
severing penalty relief from bonus expansion. Our MCS proposal
provides the most viable pathway. Under current law, married
individuals who file separately receive tax brackets equal to just half the
joint bracket allowance (thereby negating any penalty relief). By
increasing these separate brackets above the current levels, our proposal
would provide penalty relief without any simultaneous increase in
marriage bonuses. In fact, such penalty relief might support decreases to
certain joint bracket allowances.193 These decreases would create
offsetting revenue benefits to help defray the cost of the penalty relief
from the higher separate brackets. In addition, our proposal fosters joint
collaboration by simply aggregating each spouse’s separate tax amounts
on a joint return.
Other recent proposals likewise combine penalty reduction with
bonus retention, lending support to our split approach. We show the
superiority of our approach over these other intriguing ideas. On the one
hand, our proposal avoids the cliff effect and bonus entanglement
problems of the interesting idea to grant only even-earner couples a
higher joint bracket allowance. In the other direction, our MCS approach
is more flexible and revenue friendly than a married filing single
approach.194 We then utilize these principles to improve upon Jeb Bush’s
191. The reluctance to remove the alternative minimum tax despite widespread dissatisfaction
evidences the extreme current focus on revenue implications. See supra note 106.
192. As discussed above, these proposals would increase the joint marital brackets to twice the
singles allowances. See supra text accompanying notes 104–05.
193. That is, to the extent that the joint bracket allowance is attributable to penalty relief. See
supra the discussion in Part IV.E.
194. A married filing single approach would allow married individuals to use the singles
brackets. Our enhanced married filing separate approach would expand the current married filing
separate brackets, but not necessarily all the way to the singles allowance.
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intriguing hybrid approach.195 With our modifications, this approach
provides a plausible alternative pathway to reform, albeit at a greater
administrative cost. Finally, we resisted the temptation to provide
absolute parameters for each tax bracket level. Rather, we sketched
guidelines to maintain maximum flexibility. We also hope that others
will share the baton in making useful refinements now that we have
highlighted the general framework and pathway for meaningful reform.
Our MCS proposal would remove the tax incentives for couples to
cohabitate in lieu of marriage or engage in legal antics like the Boyters.
All couples could rightfully base the important marital decision on
personal factors such as love, shared values, compatibility and the more
appropriate legal implications of marriage. Obergefell requires no less.

195. Bush’s hybrid approach consists of a separate wage return with a joint investment income
filing. Without our adjustment, Bush’s proposal goes too far, as it allows the low-earner spouse to
use the singles bracket for wages and full use of the (higher) joint bracket allowance for the
couples’ remaining income.

